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THE YEAR AT WESTMINSTER: THE SCOTLAND 
ACT BRINGS DOWN THE GOVERNMENT 




After the Referendum 
Scotland was, once again, the fulcrum on which the political 
year turned at Westminster. On one side of the balance was 
the need for the Labour Party to continue the tortured progress 
of devolution to which they had committed themselves. On the 
other was the survival of the Government. In the end, neither 
aim was achieved and the whole structure collapsed, leaving 
the Royal High School in Edinburgh an empty shell and the 
Callaghan Govetnment tottering into an early election which 
in its heart it knew it could not win. 
So the story of devolution at Westminster after the refer-
endum is the story of what might have been. Had the 
referendum result been decisive the Commons would probably 
have given reluctant support to the Scotland Act, even without 
a 40% vote. The Government could have eased devolution from 
the centre of the stage and slipped through the summer to an 
October election which James Callaghan believed gave him 
at least an even chance of blocking Mrs Thatcher's progress 
to Downing Street. 
If the "No" side had won, the problem would have still 
been simple. Politically it would have been easy to drop the 
hot potato and, while it would have outraged the SNP, the 
Government's authority would not have been challenged as a 
result. But neither course was open to the Labour leadership. 
When 32.9% of the electorate voted "yes" the loyalty of 
Labour's devolution converts was strained to its limit, and the 
morale of the dedicated opponents of the Assembly rose to new 
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heights. Within days of the resumption of Parlament, Eric 
Moonman, the Labour MP for Basildon (who was to lose his 
seat in the Election on May 3) was whipping the anti-devolution-
ists in.to strategy meetings to put pressure on Michael Foot, Lord 
President and Leader of the Commons. They urged him to 
move forward immediately with the repeal of the Scotland 
Act. Most Labour devolutionists maintained a polite and 
embarrassed silence. 
Within a month of the referendum the Government had 
fallen, the first time since 1924 that a Prime Minister had 
been sent to the Queen with his resignation after losing a vote 
of confidence. The problem which exercised Callaghan's mind 
in that month was one of timing. 
Although the Scotland Act had been amended by Messrs 
Cunningham, Dalyell et al to force repeal if the 40% require-
ment was not met, the length of time the repeal order could 
lie on the table before the fateful vote was unrestricted. Indeed 
one of the most celebrated backstairs confrontations of the 
early devolution days was a chance meeting between George 
Cunningham, architect of the 40% vote, and John Smith, then 
the Devolution Minister. Just after the anti-devolutionists' 
triumph in inserting the clause, which they believed would kill 
devolution, Smith pointed out that if less than 40% of the 
electorate voted "yes" the Government could, firstly, let the 
repeal order lie for a long time and, secondly, could whip its 
supporters to vote down its own order. In retrospect this all 
seems painfully obvious, but at the time - long before the 
referendum - Cunningham was shocked, and furious. That 
realisation was later to become a near nightmare for him and 
his followers as the Government wriggled to find a way out of 
the impasse. 
When the result came through, Callaghan decided to play 
for time. There is a school of thought which holds that a quick 
vote in the week after the referendum might have won the 
day. But although many suggested this would have been the 
best tactic, it was not a genuine option at the time. Such was 
the consistency of the wet blanket which extinguished all 
devolution fervour on March 1 that the Government Whips 
would have had the devil's own job in persuading their re-
calcitrant MPs into the lobby to vote down the repeal order. 
And they told the Cabinet so. A defeat at that stage would 
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have done no good - even if we assume a lukewarm Govern-
ment commitment to devolution - because it would almost 
certainly have precipitated a vote of confidence which the 
Tories, with the support of SNP MPs looking for electoral 
benefit, would have won. 
So the Government's best hope was to gain time to catch 
its breath. Yet in the end the Government choked, in a par-
ticularly humiliating way, and the reason had more to do with 
the dangers of political bluffing than the merits or otherwise 
of devolution. Indeed, it now seems likely that the demise of 
the Edinburgh Assembly and the collapse of the Government 
came about because of a political blunder by Callaghan, the 
old master. Whether it was caused by a lack of nerve or political 
misjudgement or sheer exhaustion (or by a combination of all 
three) we cannot tell. But the fate of the Government was 
sealed at a meeting in Foot's room at the Commons on the 
night before Callaghan made his statement on the future of 
the Scotland Act on 22 March - the "wait and see" announce-
ment which brought on the vote of confidence. Before looking 
at the events of that day it is worth going back to the days 
immediately after "Black Friday" when the referendum results 
came in. 
Immediately after the results, it was fairly clear that the 
game was up. The Scotsman's banner headline on 3 March was 
"Callaghan fighting for survival: plans for Assembly gravely 
wounded", and that was no overstatement. Within hours of 
the result one prominent Scots Labour MP was wondering 
aloud whether he could vote for radical constitutional change 
in the face of the electorate's verdict. Yet he had been one 
of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Assembly. By Sunday 
a survey for the television programme "Weekend World" sug-
gested that a minimum of twenty-four Labour MPs would rebel 
against any attempt to vote down the repeal order. David Steel, 
the Liberal leader, was "far from certain" that the Act should 
be saved. So the portents were bad. 
Mrs Thatcher, the Tory leader, warned the Government 
that they would be bending the Constitution if they tried to 
prolong the devolution business. This statement illustrated her 
concern. She could see in the collapse of a measure which was 
unpopular (at least at Westminster) a chance for her long-
awaited vote of confidence, but she had to tread carefully. 
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Nothing would be worse for party morale than for her to 
rush into the ring, throw down a censure motion and then find 
herself on the losing side. She had to be sure of her moment. 
She feared that any successful delaying tactic by the Govern-
ment would leave her looking weak, apparently unwilling to 
challenge Labour to a vote of confidence. She also had to worry 
about the SNP, necessary partners in any successful confidence 
vote. 
Their line, early on, was predictable and clear. "A Yes is 
a Yes is a Yes", they said. No one need worry about the 40%, 
indeed it would be treacherous even to consider it. As usual 
there were two camps. A kamikaze squad wanted an immediate 
challenge to the Government, in the hope of reaping rewards 
in an early election. Another group wanted to turn every screw 
on the Government, without opening the trap door, even if 
it meant some kind of amendment which would get a modified 
Bill through, although this view (at that time or since) has 
never been properly clarified. Publicly the SNP said: "either 
we get our Assembly now or there is an election". So Callaghan's 
most sensible course, faced with SNP threats against no action, 
and Tory threats against an attempt to vote down the repeal, 
was to play for time and, so the story went, call the SNP bluff. 
In the middle distance, of course, was the Government's 
other problem - the so-called winter of discontent after the 
failure of the 5% pay policy. As a result of his blunder in 
not seizing the opportunity of an election in October 1978 
(largely because of the promptings of Michael Foot) and his 
miscalculation about the reception of his pay policy by rank-
and-file trade unionists, Callaghan feared an early election. 
October 1979 was the goal, but this soon became June as the 
Parliamentary pressure on the Government increased week by 
week and they began to run out of legislation. It was a question 
of winning not a few more months, but a few more weeks. 
Against this background, which moved into vivid close-up 
after the referendum, the safest policy seemed to be what came 
to be known as "the Frankenstein solution". This, appropriately, 
was one of the last additions to the devolution patois which had 
grown up over a decade and included such favourites as "Dalin-
tober Street", "The Secretary of State's governor general powers" 
and, of course, "the West Lothian question". "Frankenstein" 
actually began life as Dracula but a newspaper got the allusion 
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all wrong, and Frankenstein it stayed. The idea was that the 
Act could be preserved in suspended animation, even through 
a General Election, to be revived (under a Labour government) 
with a surge of energy which would startle the world and grant 
the beast virtual immortality. 
The Scottish Council of the Labour Party played along 
towards this general aim. The meeting of its executive after 
the referendum regretted the result, but stopped short of a 
ringing call to the Government to push the Act through what-
ever the consequences. The message was clear: they made 
Callaghan well aware of their support for the Act and their 
belief in its electoral value but left the wheeling and dealing 
to him. At the same time the National Council of the SNP 
said they would ask their MPs to bring the Government down 
if the Act were not pushed through. 
When Callaghan said in the Commons on March 6 that 
"of course" the repeal orders would be brought forward, he 
knew that the Labour antis were being numbered at anything 
up to 40. Warnings had come from the Whips that there was 
no sign of slackening in their opposition to the very idea of 
voting against the repeal. David Steel was having difficulty 
holding Liberals behind the Act. Richard Wainwright had already 
said bluntly that he would vote against it. 
Frankenstein was to be created through all-party talks. 
Such talks were the devolutionists' way out. In the early days 
after the referendum it appeared to be working. The SNP and 
the Liberals calmed their rhetoric, and seemed content to help 
Callaghan to play along until after the Budget. This would 
have suited the Prime Minister well because by then the defeat 
of devolution would pale into insignificance beside the treasured 
prize of a June election, far away from the winter's slough of 
despond. 
At Labour's annual Scottish conference on March 12, little 
miracles were worked and there was no call - officially - for 
a three-line Whip against rebels. Clearly the calculations of the 
party managers had reached Perth. There comes a time when 
three-line Whips start to lose their sting, and the fag end of 
a Parliament is just such a time. 
While Labour in Scotland were agonising about their many 
internal divisions, the SNP, through George Reid, MP for East 
Stirlingshire and Clackmannan, announced that they would 
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delay a censure vote only if the Scotland Act were put to the 
test within three weeks. They presented a tough line, although 
it later crumbled privately when they considered in detail the 
likely consequences of an early election. Talks, Reid said, could 
take place after the vote. In this he was echoing Mrs Thatcher's 
line and preparing the way for the alliance which would ditch 
the Government. With the Liberals committed to an early 
election - as they had been since October - the opposition 
line-up began to look formidable indeed. Frankenstein was the 
only answer, but he had what could be called a credibility 
problem. 
No one was particularly happy about ducking a decision 
on devolution. Even the Assembly's enthusiastic supporters in 
the Labour Party felt uncomfortable about the ploy, since it 
reeked of smoke-filled rooms. Some of them wanted to face 
execution bravely. Apart from anything else there was the 
question of what the Scottish people would think. Most of them 
were supposed to believe either that a simple majority was 
enough and the Act should be put to the Parliamentary test 
or that there was no mandate for such a constitutional change 
and the whole thing should be shelved, with the possibility of 
some kind of second-best devolution for those who were philo-
sophically committed to it. Frankenstein made sense at West-
minster, but nowhere else, and that was his greatest weakness. 
In the middle of March the pressures on the Government 
began to increase. Donald Stewart, the SNP leader, met 
Callaghan in the Prime Minister's room and told him bluntly 
that there had to be a vote, and quickly. The SNP seemed to 
have decided that an early election, on balance, would be better 
for them than one in the autumn, although it was a fine judge-
ment to say the least. They could see no political advantage in 
talking with Callaghan and nourishing Frankenstein. 
D-day was to be Thursday March 22 when Callaghan would 
make his statement on the future of the Act, a statement which 
would probably have been delayed even longer had it not been 
for the sudden burst of SNP activity that week. On Thursday 
morning the Cabinet met and, with the knowledge that the 
Chief Whip could not guarantee a majority to keep the Act 
alive, played along with the Prime Minister for more time. 
Much more interesting was what had happened the previous 
night. 
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On Wednesday March 21 the SNP had held their weekly 
party meeting at Westminster and discussed their attitude to 
the Act. Stewart had already made his position clear to Callaghan 
and he was not prepared to change hi's stance. He told colleagues 
that if he backed down no one who mattered at Westminster 
would take his word for anything again. He was determined 
to continue to tell the Government that unless a vote on repeal 
was promised by the end of the following week the SNP would 
put down a motion of no confidence, one which everyone knew 
would finally lure Mrs Thatcher into the fight. 
But by this stage some SNP MPs were wondering about 
the wisdom of killing off the Act so quickly. All but one of 
them believed that there was no hope of getting it through, 
even with a three-line Government Whip. They were well aware 
of the feelings of their Labour enemies. Some wanted simply 
to keep the argument alive, while there was still an Act to 
cling to, and others believed that it would do them no harm 
in the eyes of the electorate if they were seen to give Labour 
another chance and wait, confidently, for Labour to come up 
with nothing. In that position, some of the MPs believed they 
would be poised to hold electoral ground that seemed to be 
fast slipping away. 
Two MPs were missing from that meeting. The nine 
present discussed various possibilities and it was clear that 
Stewart was facing opposition. Some of the MPs wanted to 
give the Government more time (even if it was only to let 
them fail dramatically). No dates were fixed, but the deadline 
of the following week was beginning to stretch. It was put to 
the vote and the MPs came down 5 - 4 to have an open-ended 
look at Callaghan's statement if he named a date, even if that 
date was beyond the previous deadline of ten days. Stewart 
let it be known that he might find it necessary to resign as 
leader if the party failed to carry out its threat to bring down 
the Government. 
Late that evening, Stewart and Andrew Welsh, his Chief 
Whip, went along the corridor to Michael Foot's room, where 
the Lord President was already convinced that the Government 
would face a confidence vote within a week or two. Despite all 
the ambiguous statements from the SNP, senior Ministers were 
sure that anything less than a speedy vote (which they knew 
they would lose) would have the SNP Whips rushing to the 
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table office with their censure motion, closely pursued by breath-
less Tories. They did not know that the SNP Parliamentary 
group was splitting at the seams over devolution. 
So Foot, who already knew what Callaghan intended to 
say the next day, was not surprised when Stewart said that 
they needed a firm date. He did not name a date, concealing 
the weakness in his position which had opened up earlier. Foot 
saw Callaghan. It seems that by this stage the Prime Minister 
was initated by the whole business. His instinct was to get 
on with it, whatever the consequences. Looking at the alterna-
tives it was clear that the Government would stand a better 
chance of surviving a confidence vote and humiliating Mrs 
Thatcher than carrying devolution. Better to have a confidence 
vote without the disastrous split which a vote on the Scotland 
Act would reveal· in the Labour ranks, and which would lead 
to an even more dangerous censure debate. 
The Callaghan statement set a time limit of the end of 
April for all-party talks on improving the Scotland Act. 
Immediately Stewart rose to denounce him. "The Prime Minister 
is not prepared to face the outcome of an early vote on this," 
he said. "He is prepared to treat the Scottish people with con-
tempt rather than face an early election." No one in the party 
could accept the Prime Minister's statement - i,t was too 
vague - and the motion of no confidence duly went down 
within an hour, followed shortly afterwards by Mrs Thatcher's 
own motion. Perhaps the most suitable comment on the episode 
was made by Willie Ross, the former Scottish Secretary of 
State, in his last Commons intervention. "Is the Prime Minister 
aware that I wish him well," he said, "but I hae rna doots?" 
So the Commons moved towards the confidence vote, 
through the wheeling and dealing with the Welsh Nationalists 
over compensation for slate-quarrymen, the vague hints to 
Ulster Unionists, and the arm-twisting of Frank Maguire, the 
maverick Republican. In the end the Government lost by one 
vote, with one Labour MP missing sick. They nearly made it. 
That vote ended Callaghan's hopes of a summer election, 
and so his chances of keeping power. Yet how different it could 
have been. If he had promised a vote on the Scotland Act 
on the day before the Easter recess he would have spHt the 
SNP. Perhaps a confidence motion would have gone down any-
way, but it would probably have had some names missing. In 
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those circumstances the Tories would have held back, and he 
could have held on for a few weeks. That was all he wanted. 
But he seems to have been convinced that the SNP were 
solid. Perhaps they would have closed ranks in any case, but 
it would have been a delicate manoeuvre. Yet because of the 
insipid statement their unity was never put to the test. If the 
statement had offered something more tangible it would, of 
course, have offended the Labour antis but that would scarcely 
have mattered. It would have given the Government that breath-
ing space which they needed to prepare for a dangerous election. 
Yet maybe justice was done. By the end of the process, 
devolution had become little more than a symbol of the 
Government's troubles, and a lever for the Opposition. As 
soon as the results came in, Westminster knew that the scheme 
was dead. The Prime Minister's mistake was that he did not 
realise that the SNP might after all have helped him to prolong 
the agony, and postpone the funeral. 
After the election the Conservative Government moved 
quickly to repeal the Act. On a long, hot night in June, MPs 
voted 301 - 206 to throw it out. At the same time, Mr George 
Younger, the Secretary of State for Scotland, announced that 
all-party talks on devolution would start soon. The Labour 
Party argued that the Act should stay on the statute book 
while the talks went on, but the Government were determined 
to clean the slate. Mr Malcolm Rifkind, a Scottish Minister 
(who had campaigned for "Yes" in the referendum) talked at 
the end of the debate about the beginning of a new phase of 
devolution. It was clearly to be non-legislative, and the young 
and ill-starred Scotland Act, with the Assembly it created, was 
just an unpleasant memory. 
II 
The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill 
One of the casualties of the vote of confidence which brought 
down the Labour Government was a Bill which focused the 
law and order debate in Scotland, and showed that in some 
respects Labour Ministers were trying to trump their Tory 
opponents in the rush to strengthen the police and claim credit 
for reducing crime. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill had 
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just finished its dramatic committee stage when the Govern-
ment fell, and to no one's surprise it was not one of the pieces 
of agreed legislation rushed through before the Election. 
It was a stern Bill. Tucked away in a host of procedural 
reforms was a proposal to allow police officers to question a 
suspect at a police station for four hours without having to 
make an arrest. It also proposed an extraordinary power giving 
sheriffs and judges the right to conduct trials in the absence 
of the accused. 
Its tough measures were attacked on the Labour side by 
civil libertarians - principally Donald Dewar (Garscadden) and 
Neil Carmichael (Kelvingrove) - and by Conservatives who 
claimed that the BiH did not go far enough in strengthening 
the power of the police. 
The long sessions of the Scottish Standing Committee, in 
which the Bill was discussed line by line, revealed splits in both 
parties. Ronald King Murray, the Lord Advocate, and Harry 
Ewing, an Under-Secretary, found themselves under constant 
attack from Dewar and Carmichael for infringing personal 
liberty. 
On the Tory side, the troops were led by Nicholas Fair-
bairn, later to become Solicitor General for Scotland. He argued, 
most of the time, for stronger powers, (backing for example, 
greater powers of search for the police and the creation of a 
new offence of "vandalism) but also, as a practising advocate. 
attacked some of its powers as "a hordfic breach in the laws 
of natural justice". This did not always please Teddy Taylor, 
who sat on the Committee and called consistentlv for more 
powers in the Bill. 
The Government suffered two memorable defeats. In the 
first Peter Doig (then MP for Dundee West) used his chair-
man's casting vote to support a Tory amendment giving the 
police wide powers of search. In the second the "draconian" 
power given to a judge to expel an accused from a courtroom 
and continue a case in his absence was thrown out by an 
alliance of Tories and Dewar, Carmichael and Gordon Wilson, 
the SNP member of the Committee. 
Yet for all the confusion the lines were fairly clearly 
drawn. The Conservatives argued, among other things, for the 
return of the birch. Among those voting for the proposals were 
two MPs later to become Ministers, Malcolm Rifkind and 
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Hamish Gray, as well as Mr Fairbairn. They failed in attempts 
to oblige judges to give minimum sentences for murderers, to 
reduce the number of jury challenges, to introduce a general 
crime of vandalism and, of course, to bring back corporal 
punishment. 
Throughout the committee stage they were attacked for 
proposing bogus solutions to problems and Mr Taylor, inevit-
ably, was described as Ayatollah Taylor. In return the Tories 
united behind a standard Right-wing claim that Labour mem-
bers cared more for criminals than for their victims. 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the long debates 
was the Government's concern to steal the Conservative claim 
to speak on law and order. Mr Ewing said he was a member 
of the law and order party: they had increased the number 
of policemen in Scotland by 1000 since coming to office, he 
said. 
In this race to be tougher with lawbreakers the scene was 
set for the Tory law reforms certain to be introduced during 
Mrs Thatcher's first administration. With the exception of the 
biTching proposals, which Mr Taylor admitted reluctantly were 
not official party policy, their views on curbing crime can be 
expected to be enshrined in law. It seems likely that the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, for all its bitter battles, was 
only a preliminary skirmish. 
